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Early Background

C

ontrary to popular belief, the initiative for the Third United Nations Omfer-

cnce on the Law of the Sea did not originate with Ambassador Pardo's famous
speech before the Genera1 Assembly in 1967. Although this speech dramatized ocean
seabed issues to the in ternational community and gave us the now-famous phrase of

"common heritage of mankind," the idea for a third conference germinated from several different sources, one of the principal of which was the US government.
More than a year prior to Ambassador Pardo's speech, the US House of Represen tatives touched off the process in a letter to the Department of State suggesting a
study of the international implications of developing resources of the seabed. The
reply from the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations indicated that the

State Department "was unaware of any need for a study of international law or foreign policy relating to the development of the natural resources of the oceans."l
The attention of the State Department was pricked again in 1966 when the Soviet
Union sent a letter to some sixty States about the possibility of convening a third
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law of the sea conference. 2 The letter dealt explicitly only with the issue of the
breadth of the territorial sea, which was left unresolved by the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the failed 1960 Second United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 3 This letter was basically an appeal to affirm the
Soviet position on the 12 mile territorial sea. 4 When the Soviet proposal was received, it touched off a six-month study by the Departments of State and Defense
and the Bureau of Comm ercial Fisheries.s This study group concluded that the Department of Defense could live with a 12 mile territorial sea, provided it was accompanied by a right of free passage through international straits, but it also
recognized that this solution was not attainable without some accommodation between coastal and maritime States with respect to fisheries. There was also apprehension by the Department of Defense that the process might get out of control
and urged that any international negotiation should be conducted in "manageable
packages."6
Concurrently with this effort, the Office of International Organizations of the
Department of State, apparently without extensive vetting by other departments,
launched its own initiative in the United Nations. James Roosevelt, the US delegate
to the United Nations, sent a letter to Secretary-General U Thant suggesting that
the Secretariat conduct a study "of the state of knowledge concerning undersea
resources and exploitation technology."7As an immediate consequence, the UN &0nomic and Social Council adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General
" make a survey of the present state of knowledge of [the non-fish resources of the
sea beyond the continental shelf] , and of the techniques for exploiting these resources," particularly those capable of exploitation for the benefit of developing
countries. 8
Echoing this theme, President Johnson, in his remarks at the commissioning of
the ocean research ship Oceanograpller in 1966, stated:
[U] nder no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich
harvests and mineral wealth [of the oceans] to create a new form of colonial
competition among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab
and to hold the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the
ocean bottoms are the legacy of all human beings.9

With this as background, it was not really a giant step for Ambassador Pardo,
representing the State of Malta, to propose in 1967 that the mineral resources of the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction be declared the "common heritage of mankind n to be developed for the benefit of all nations. lo He went on to predict that the
volume of these resources was so vast and so easily mined that in a few years the

112

Horace B. Robertson Jr.
ores would yield at least $5 billion profit annually to be distributed for the benefit
of the poorer coun tries of the Third World. II The US Ambassador to the United
Nations, Arthur Goldberg, heartily endorsed including the item on the agenda of
the First Commiuee. 11
Enticed by the " mirage" of the wealth of the deep seabed predicted by Ambassador Pardo, the UN General Assembly rapidly formed an ad hoc committee to study
seabed issues-the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 13 This committee, in turn, was
made a permanent committee and morphed in to the Preparatory Committee for a
Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea.
Congress quickly took notice of the Malta proposal, and almost immediately
several bills were introduced in the House and Senate, mostly unfavorable to the
idea of an in ternational regime for the seabed. In testimony before several committees that held hearings on the issue, Johnson administration witnesses displayed
some uncertainty and confusion about the US position but generally stated that
given the present state of knowledge, it was premature to consid er international
control over the resources of the seabed. 14 The UN resolution and the uncertain ty
indicated by the congressional hearings d id, however, stimulate action within the
Executive Branch to take action to coordinate the formation of a unified US policy
on the law of the sea, responsibility for which previously had been divided among
many d epartments. The result was the creation of the Committee on International
Policy in the Marine Environment (CIPME), under the chairmanship of the Deputy Under Secretary of State. Day-to-day leadership was under the International
Organizations Office of the State Department, but eventually was assumed b y the
Legal Adviser. IS By the time of the second session of the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee
in June 1968, as a result o f the work of the CIPME, the United States was able to
submit to the Seabed Committee a draft declaration of seven principles, two of
which were
(1) that no state might claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of
the deep ocean floor; and (2) that international arrangements to govern exploitation of
deep-sea resources should be established as soon as practicable, with provisions for the
orderly development of resources and for the dedication of a part of the value of the
resources to "international community PUrposeS."16

By 1970 the principle of the deep seabed as the common heritage of mankind was
apparently so firmly established within the US governm ent's policy on the law of
the sea that it was included in President Nixon's ocean policy statement ofMay23,
1970, in which he stated, in part:
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I am today proposing that all nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under which
they would renounce all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed
beyond the point where the high seas reach a depth of200 meters . . . and would agree
to regard these resources as the common heritage of mankind. 17

The President's statement went on to say that the treaty should establish an international regime for the exploitation of seabed resources beyond this limit and provide for agreed international machinery to authorize and regulate exploration and
use of seabed resources beyond the continental margin. 16 On August 3 of the same
year, the United States submitted to the UN Seabed Committee a d raft UN Convention on the International Seabed as "a working paper for discussion purposes"
that spelled out the details of machinery fo r the exploration and explo itation of the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and provided that developing countries
would share in the revenues. 19 It also included a provision for the establishment of
a law of the sea tribunal for settlement of disputes.2o

The Opposition Emerges
It can be seen then that, from the o utset, the principle of the "common heritage of

mankind" and the creation of an international body to orchestrate the exploration
and exploitation of its mineral resources was not something invented by Third
World States to use against the United States, but was a principle accepted and advanced from the outset by the US government at alllcveis. What, then, changed between 1970 and 1982 to make that principle, as now codified in Part Xl of the Law
of the Sea Convention 21 unacceptable to the United States at that time? The stated
cause, as expressed by President Reagan in his January and July 1982 announcements that the United States would not adhere to the Convention, was the specific tenus of the machinery adopted to implement the common-heritage principle in
the deep seabed. In his statements, the President identified six provisions in Part Xl of
the Convention that could not be accepted by the United States. He added, however,
that if these objectionable provisions were corrected, he would support ratification.n
The President's statement was reinforced and amplified a month later by the
statement of the President's then-Special Representative for the Law of the Sea,
Ambassador James L. Malone, in his statement to the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee in which he testified that the United States has "a strong interest in an effective Law of the Sea Treaty"23 and six m o nths later when he testified
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the United States was "not seeking to change the basic structure of the treaty" or " to destroy the system" but rather
to " make it work."24
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With the defects in the machinery identified by President Reagan having been
fixed by the 1994 Agreement superseding the objectionable elements of Part Xl;25
with President Clinton having forwarded the Convention and the 1994 Agreement to the Senate strongly recommending adherence;26 with his successor,
George W. Bush, having strongly renewed that recommendation;21 and with the Senate Republican-chaired Foreign Relations Committee having unanimously recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent to the Convention in
2004,28 why is there still controversy even in getting it to a vote by the full Senate?
The result may be partly the result of higher-priority items displacing it on the
Senate agenda-after all, the argument goes, the American stakeholders appear to
be functioning without difficulty in a non-treaty environment. But the major
bugaboo, in my view and that of others as well, in 1982, as well as today, is ideologicaL The most vocal opposition advocates view with suspicion any action by the
United States that accepts any arrangement for decision making by an international institution. In their view this is a "surrender of sovereignty. "29
This ideology was stated early on in a surprising statement by Ambassador
Malone at the Sixth Annual Conference of the University of Virginia Center for
Oceans Law and Policy held in Montego Bay in January 1983-0nly one month after the opening of the Convention for signature at the identical location and only
six months after the President's announcement of his decision not to sign the Convention. The statement was "surprising" in that it directly contradicted the President's statement and Ambassador Malone's contemporaneous testimony before
the two House committees that the US objective was not to scuttle the Convention
but to make it work. At the University of Virginia Conference, Mr. Malone stated:
The Treaty ... is a document which, hiding behind the mask of superficially appealing
slogans like the "new international economic order" and the "common heritage of
mankind," promotes a thinly disgui~ world collectivism. It is intended as an
instrument for the redistribution of the world's wealth from those who have acquired
their prosperity by risk. sacrifice, and hard work to those who seek to promote their
prosperity through organizational means.)(I

Replying to those who suggested that the flaws could be corrected through
"PREPCOM, and other means," he added, "The plain fact is that there exists no
possibility nor instrument for making the important changes that would satisfy
President Reagan's objections."}l
Ambassador Malone continued:
The potential impact on the U.S., its friends and allies is without parallel. Think of the
latent danger. We are discussing an institution that would exert supreme control over
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the deep oceans and their mineral wealth representing over 60% of the resource
potential of planet Earth.
I sometimes wonder how many informed and well-meaning Americans can be willing
to compromise principals [sic] and values which support America's national greatness
and mortgage our future economic health and security interests for a treaty that is little
better than an international entitlement program-----a give away.32

Opposition Arguments against the Convention
The arguments put forth by Ambassador Malone's remarks at the University of
Virginia conference form the core of current arguments against adherence to the
Convention-that is, the Convention is a surrender of sovereignty and amounts to
a giveaway)3 Opponents bolster their arguments by pointing out what they perceive as specific fla ws in the substantive provisions of the Convention. They are
phrased somewhat differently in the many statements originating with the opposition, but in essence they boil down to the following:
1. The seabed provisions (Part Xl ) give the International Seabed Authority
(ISA) jurisdiction over all activities occurring in over 70 percent of the earth's surface (ocean, seabed and airspace above);
2. The 1994 Agreement did not really correct the fla ws in Part Xl of the
Convention;
3. Adherence to the Convention would impede the conduct of US maritime intelligence operations and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);
4. Since most of the provisions of the Convention reflect customary internationallaw, we don't need the Convention to protect our maritime interests;
5. The Convention's provisions for compulsory dispute settlement could result
in bringing the United States within the jurisdiction of an international tribunal
against our will;
6. The Convention gives the International Seabed Authority power to "levy
taxes" (some critics conflate the Convention's seabed-governing body (the ISA)
into the United Nations); and
7. Pressure to accede to the Convention is a "rush to judgment."

Counterarguments
All of the foregoing criticisms have been effectively answered in detail by government officials and independent experts numerous times and in detail in many fora,
including congressional hearings, official reports and other public discussions. I
will not attempt to answer them in detail in this article but will briefly summarize
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the gist of the responses and, where appropriate, provide in the endnotes some reference to where the interested reader may find amplification.:l4
Jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority
The jurisdiction of the ISA is limited to the "solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed."3sThe Area, in turn, is defined
as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction."}/; Article 135 explicitly provides, "Neither this Part [Part Xl] nor any
rights granted or exercised pursuant thereto shall affect the legal status of the waters superjacent to the Area or that of the air space above those waters."
The 1994 Agreement
The changes adopted in this «Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part Xl
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982" supersede any conflicting tenns in the 1982 LOS Convention and meet all of the objections raised by President Reagan in his 1982 statement. The Agreement
substantially overhauls the Authority's decision-making procedure, including
provisions guaranteeing the United States a permanent seat on the powerful Council and Finance Committee. It requires that in these bodies important decisions
and financial decisions be made by consensus, thus, in essence, giving the United
States veto power. The development principles incorporated in the Agreement are
market-based and require the operating arm (the Enterprise), when activated, to
compete on the same basis as other commercial enterprises. It eliminates all subsidies inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The site claims
of mining companies already licensed under US laws are grandfathered, and the requirement for mandatory transfer of technology is eliminatedY In a letter to the
Chainnan of the Senate Armed Services Committee, all living fonn er Legal Advisers of the Department of State, who constitute a continuum of service from 1977
to 2000, authoritatively refuted the argument that the 1994 Agreement had not
cured the provisions of the 1982 Convention to which President Reagan objected. :l8
Proliferation Security Initiative and US Maritime Intelligence Surveillance
The US-developed PSI is directed toward preventing the illicit transportation by
ships of weapons of mass destruction, their deli vel)' systems and related materials.
Under the Law of the Sea Convention and customary international law, a number
of jurisdictional bases exist for stopping and searching ships suspected of being engaged in some sort of illicit activity. These include jurisdiction exercised by a State
with respect to ships flying its flag or within its territorial sea, ports or contiguous
11 7
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zone, and stateless vessels. It is also permissible to stop and search a foreign- flag
vessel with the permission of the flag State. The PSI builds on this latter basis ofjurisdiction with a series of bilateral agreements by which the United States and its
treaty partners agree in advance on a set of orderly procedures for the reciprocal
granting of permission for visits and search of suspected ships and cargoes. There is
nothing in the Convention that would change the law in any respect with respect to
the US practices under the Proliferation Security Initiative. 39
Likewise, with respect to intelligence operations, the Law of the Sea Convention
contains no restrictions on US naval surveillance and intelligence operations not
already included in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone to which the United States is already a party.40
Customary Law of the Sea as an Acceptable Alternative to the Convention
There is at least a germ of truth in this argument. The United States and its maritime activities are functioning reasonably well under the customary regime of the
law of the sea. Most of the Convention is indeed a codification of customary international law. President Reagan's 1982 statements acknowledged this and pledged
that the United States would abide by its rules.· 1 But customary law does not provide the precision and detail of a written document. It may establish a principle,
but its content may remain imprecise, subject to a range of interpretations. With
respect to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), for example, it is generally conceded
today that the principle of the zone has become a part of customary international
law. But what about its content? The details are contained in a set of articles codifying a series of compromises worked out in meticulous detail in the negotiations
leading up to the signing of the Convention. The rules for determining the allowable catch of the living resources of the EEZ, the determination of the coastal State's
capacity to harvest them, the determination of the allowable catch by other States
and the rules governing the coastal State's establishing of terms and conditions for
foreign fishermen in their EEZs are laid out in detail. 42
Customary rules are fuzzy around the edges and may not be recognized as binding by an opposing State. The "jurisdiction creep," which continued after the 1958
and 1960 First and Second UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea, illustrated the
futility of relying on customary law to protect our vital security interests. Only a
written document can provide the certainty and stability required by our governmental agencies and private maritime enterprises. And in any dispute with a foreign State to secure its compliance with the rules set forth in the Convention,
arguments based on a written agreement rather than an asserted principle of
customary international law would be much more effective.
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Also, international institutions cannot be created by custom. Only through
agreements can this occur. The institutions incorporated in the Omvention are essential to its proper functioning-the Seabed Authority, the Commission on the limits of
the Continental Shelf, the Law of the Sea Tribunal and the other dispute settlement
mechanisms provided for in Part XV and Annexes V to VIII of the Convention. The
marine scientific research articles (Part XlII ) of the Convention also provide for implied consent to research requests in foreign waters if there is no reply within fixed
time limits, a right not accorded to the United States as a non_party.43
Some States also argue that some of the rights of navigation set forth in the Convention are the contractual products of the negotiations and are available only to
parties to the Convention. These rights include the right oftransit passage through
international straits and archipelagic sea lanes passage, both of the utmost importance to the United States.44
Compulsory Dispute Settlement
From the outset the United States has insisted that a system of compulsory dispute
settlement be a part of any comprehensive convention on the law of the sea. 4S The
US delegation, in the person of the late Louis Sohn, took the lead in the negotiating
group that developed the final package, which became Part XV of the Convention
and its related Annexes. It is incongruous that the flexible provisions of Part XV,
worked out under the leadership of the United States, should now be the basis of
objection to the Convention. The objectors suggest, without basis in fact, that the
United States might be dragged against its will into the jurisdiction of the Law of
the Sea Tribunal, particularly with respect to our military activities.4/) They ignore
the terms of the Convention that provide, with respect to compulsory procedures
entailing binding decisions, an opportunity for States, upon signing, ratifying or
acceding to the Convention, "or at any time thereafter," to choose the binding procedure it will accept from a menu of settlement mechanismsY The United States
has indicated that it will choose arbitration under Annexes VII and VIII upon accession.48 Further, the criticism ignores the provisions of Article 298 that provide
that State parties may exclude from the applicability of "any" of the compulsory
procedures providing for binding decisions, it/ter alia, "disputes concerning military activities." One of the declarations that will accompany any US accession to
the Convention will state that its accession "is conditioned upon the understanding that, under article 298(I)(b), each State Party has the exclusive right to determine whether its activities are or were 'military activities' and that such
determinations are not subject to review. "49
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The Power to Levy Taxes
This argument is a distortion of the requirements of the Con ven tion for funding
the In ternational Seabed Authority. Under these provisions, during the period until the ISA can become self-supporting, funding its operations depends on assessments against States party to the Convention. In 2004 the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State estimated that had the United States been a party to the Conven tion , its assessmen ts for 2004 would have been a little over $1 million for the
Authority and less than $2 million for the Seabed T r ibunal. $0
The taxation objection made by opponents is often coupled with an argument
that US companies that had invested millions of dollars in exploration costs would
lose their existing claims under US law. This argument ignores the fact that the
1994 Agreement grandfathers these holders into the treaty regime based on arrangements no less favorable than those granted to holders of claims already registered with the Authority upon certification by the US government and the
paymen t of a $250,000 application fee (a fee that is half of the fee established in the
1982 Convention).SI As Ambassador Colson pointed out in the 1994 hearings, "If
the U.S. does not become Party to the Con vention, international recognition of the
rights o f the U.S. licensed consortia could be jeopardized." S2
A " Rush to Judgment»
Rather than a "rush to judgment," it is hard to find any aspect of the Convention that
has not been discussed and debated ad itlfinitum-in the public media, in academic
conferences and symposia, in legal and ocean policy literature, and in congressional
hearings. It has been studied and restudied by each successive administration, and
every government de partment and agency with a concern in the oceans supports
accession. In March 2007, in testimon y before the Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Wildlife, and Oceans of the Natural Resources Committee of the House of Rep resen tatives, Admiral James D. Watkins and Leon E. Panetta, Co-chairmen of the
Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, renewed their strong endorsement of the Conven tion, saying, among other things, that the failure of the United States to become
a party to the Convention is "one of the most serious international ocean policy issues that remain unresolved for our nation."53
On May 15, 2007, Presiden t George W. Bush issued a formal statemen t urging
the Senate
to act favorably on U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea during this session of Congress. Joining will serve the national security interests of
the United States, including the maritime mobility of our anned forces worldwide. It
will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable
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natural resources they contain. Accession will promote U.S. interests in the
environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the United States a seat at the table
when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.54
With this overwhelming support from all segments of the US econom ic and governm ental structure, one would think that Senate ad vice and consent to accession
would be a "slam dunk." The immediate effect, however, was a flurry of media articles in opposition to the Con vention , most of them from familiar names previously
identified with the opposition.55 Their argumen ts were the sam e as have been endlessly repeated since the Convention was adopted in 1982, with bu t one new argument I had not heard before. That is that the United States is giving up sovereignty
und er the tenns of Article 2, which p rovides, "The sovereignty over the territorial sea
is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of in ternationallaw."56 This
argument conveniently ignores the fact that the United States is already bound by
identical text in the 1958 Conven tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous SeaY

Th e Costs of Non-adherence
There are tangible costs for the United States in not being a party to the Law of the
Sea Convention. Un til 1998, the United States was entitled to provisional membership in the meetings of the States party to the Convention, but since then it can be
present only as an observer. Its non-accession has had and contin ues to have real
costs. It is ineligible to nominate members to the Law of the Sea T r ib unal; it has
forfeited (as of March 2007) the opportunity to nominate m embers to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf until the next election in 20 12,58 and
it can not occupy its guaran teed seat on the Council of the Seabed Authority and
the powerful Finance Committee. The marine scientific research institutions continue to suffer from long delays in gaining ap proval for research in foreign EEZs,
which would be alleviated by the Convention's implied consent provisions were
the United States a party.59
Perhaps as damaging as the concrete benefits of the Convention previously discussed is the harm to the credibility of the United States in international relations by
failing to accede to the Convention. After all, we laid out before the world in President
Reagan's 1982 statements our objections to the Convention and what would be required for the United States to become a party. By adopting the 1994 Agreement, the
international comm unity gave us what we demanded as conditions for our accession,
and now, thirteen years later, the United States has still not becom e a party.

12 1

H istorical Perspective on Prospects for

us Accession to the LOS Convention

Current Prospects fo r Accession

As of the date of preparation of this paper for publication (early September 2007),
there are indications that the Senate is prepared to take action toward granting its
advice and consent to accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Both Senator
Siden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Lugar,
the senior minority member, are strong supporters ofthe Convention. It is anticipated that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold further hearings toward the end of September. Both the Department of State and the Department of
Defense appear to have mounted a "full-court press" to obtain Senate approval. 60
The Commandant of the Coast Guard has weighed in with a strong endorsement. 61
Four fo rmer Commandants of the Coast Guard have written Senator Biden urging
the Senate to approve the Convention this session of Congress.62 But the opposition's efforts to scuttle the Convention remain active, flooding the press and the
Internet with arguments built on destroying the straw men they have created by
misrepresentations and distortions of the terms of the Convention. As one of their
spokesmen has said, "The Senate won't ratify the Convention if it is controversial,
and I'm doing everything I can to make a controversy."63
The window of opportunity for the Senate to grant its consent to accession to
the Convention in the current Il0th session of Congress is small, and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate at large both have full plates-Iraq,
Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan and immigration issues. Complicating the landscape is the fac t that the Committee Chairman, Senator Siden, is a presidential
candidate with the first state primaries only a few months away. If the Convention
cannot be brought up for a vote in this session, it is unlike1y that the Senate wouJd
be inclined to address the issue in the second session of this Congress with a presidential ele<tion looming ahead in November 2008. Those who favo r US accession
m ay have to keep their hopes alive until a new Congress convenes in January 2009.
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